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IN many areas of law practice, a knowledge of accounting is helpful and
frequently necessary. Lawyers are increasingly confronted by statutory
formulae, with their judicial and administrative gloss, geared to economic con-
cepts: the Internal Revenue Code, the Securities Act of 1933, the Public
Utilities Holding Company Act, the Chandler Act, the Robinson-Patman Act,
and the various renegotiation and price control acts are but examples. More-
over, business relationships which do not directly involve the government are
also being voluntarily tied to economic facts, and rigidity of fixed payments is
being replaced by a somewhat different distribution of business risk in profit-
sharing employment and sales contracts, and in percentage leases. State
dividend statutes which furnish insufficient protection to creditors are being
supplemented by detailed contractual provisions in loan indentures which re-
strict distribution of corporate funds to owners or managers. Even the family
relationship, when broken, often results in alimony and support payments
which are determined in part as a percentage of income. In an increasing area
of the law, then, substantive rights change with a change in economic or
financial facts. Since accounting is concerned with the recording and reporting
of economic and financial facts, lawyers must face up to learning something
about it. Concepts such as "net income" and "gross receipts," for example, are
not to be found in their pure form in nature, and the lawyer must be alert to
the problems they are likely to cause.
Law schools are now including accounting in their curricula, and professional
institutes, such as the Practicing Law Institute ' and the American Law In-
stitute,2 have published monographs on accounting in cooperation with the
American Bar Association. Two general types of materials have been develop-
ed for teaching accounting to law students. One type is modeled after the
traditional case book ;8 the other type is a modified accounting text which
emphasizes the interrelationship of law and accounting. 4 Professor Shuger-
man's work is in the textbook class. Although the philosophy and approach
of these two types of materials are different, they are frequently used to ad-
vantage together in a single course. It is against this background that Shuger-
man's book must be judged.
1. OEHLER, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS (1946).
2. FERsT, BASIC ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS (1950).
3. AMORY, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING (1949); SCHAPIRO & WIENSIIIENE, CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON LAW AND ACCOUNTING (1949). Professors Warren and
Thompson are now publishing materials developed at Columbia Law School.
4. E.g., GRAHAM & KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRACTICE (1938); FERST, BASIC
ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS (1950); OEHLER, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS (1946).
5. Amory suggests the use of elementary accounting texts as a companion to his case-
book. A MORY, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING vii, xi (1949). At Yale we have used GRAUAM
& KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRACTICE (1938) in conjunction with ScHAIRO & WIEN-
SHIENK, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON LAW AND ACCOUNTING (1949).
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REVIEWS
The book, intended for persons with no previous accounting experience,
contains 550 pages divided into three major parts. Part I, occupying roughly
one-third of the volume, is devoted to basic accounting concepts and procedures.
These chapters are, in the author's words, "the gateway chapters."0 Part II,
about 230 pages, discusses various financial statements in detail, and Part III
touches on partnerships, corporations, consignor-consignee, branch office ac-
counting, installment sales, and estates and trusts. Short extracts from
opinions, statutes, and administrative materials are interspersed in the text,
giving the student a feel for the purpose of his study. Examination of books
of account and underlying records for evidentiary purposes is stressed. For
this, the author is to be commended.
On the whole, however, I question whether Professor Shugerman has made
a significant contribution to the legal accounting literature. In the foreword,
the author states: "Brevity has been stressed. And at all times, simplicity has
been a foremost consideration."7 Unfortunately, the book is brief primarily
where difficult concepts worthy of elaboration are discussed, and simple at the
expense of being inadequate. For example, basic ledger accounts and journal
entries are introduced and employed in half a page without a word of previous
explanation.8 It has been my experience that on introducing the uninitiated
to the journal and ledger accounts it is well to stress the theory of double entry
bookkeeping, which requires full and careful explanation. I have no doubt that
Professor Shugerman supplies the necessary background to his accounting
classes, but for his written work he asks only that his reader have an "in-
quisitiveness to examine accounting principles and procedures."0 His most
summary development would not, in the case of the typical student, bridge
the gap between inquisitiveness and understanding."0
In its treatment of relatively difficult accounting areas, the book either dis-
misses or ignores a good many problems. Bond premium is discussed, but the
compound interest theory underlying its computation, described as the "precise
niceties of financial mathematics," is omitted." Premium on redemption of pre-
ferred stock is charged to capital surplus without any discussion of the problems
which this may create.' 2 The difficulty or desirability of computing book value
of certain preferred stocks is barely mentioned.13 The discussion of the declin-






10. On the other hand, his explanation of relatively simple matters is at times almost
irritatingly verbose. In Chapter 15, for e.mmple, he reprints (pp. 210-13) an identical
35-line portion of a balance sheet four times, changing only the type cast to emphasize




14. Pp. 265 et seq.
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Readjustment of depreciation schedules is treated so as to give the reader
the impression that only the rate applied to the undepreciated cost can be
varied; that is, there is no discussion of possible charges of credits to surplus.
Shugerman gives the following example :1' A building having a depreciable
cost (after salvage) of $40,000 has been depreciated over a ten-year period on
the assumption that it would have a useful service life of 40 years, and $10,000
depreciation (at $1,000 a year) accrued. After ten years it is decided to revise
upward the building's estimated life so that 50 (rather than 30) years of addi-
tional service is contemplated. The book states that the remaining undepre-
ciated balance of $30,000 should be charged over the next 50 years at an annual
rate of $600 a year. A far from frivolous question may be raised as to the
theoretical accuracy of such a procedure. It could be argued with equal plausi-
bility that income for the past ten years has been charged an excessive amount
of depreciation and that an adjustment to earned surplus would be in order to
allow each succeeding year to be charged with annual depreciation of $666.67
($40,000 depreciable cost -- 60 years life). As a practical matter, of course,
with the figures assumed any error introduced is too small to warrant concern,
but the important and interesting theoretical problem should be discussed. This
is particularly true when a book is aimed at lawyers, who are likely to be con-
cerned with contentious areas of accounting.
Even leaving aside omissions which could be justified on the grounds of
textual simplicity, the book has a more serious fault: except in the inventory
section,1 6 the relationship of the balance sheet to the income statement is not
sufficiently stressed. A "conservative" balance sheet value for a depreciable
asset may grossly inflate net income because of unrealistic depreciation charges.
The discussion of "nominal values" omits this thought entirely." An example
of this general failing appears in sentences such as: "For example, one interested
in only a business' past profitability and not concerned with its present debts
and liabilities would look only to the P & L statement."'" Only the most naive
of analysts would not look closely into such factors as depreciation and amorti-
zation, and relevant information might be found only on the balance sheet or
related schedules.
A law school course in accounting should, of course, first acquaint the student
with the outlines of bookkeeping procedures and concepts so that he can read
financial statements and understand the process by which they are constructed.
But for the lawyer who is likely to be concerned primarily with controversial
areas of accounting, this is only a first step towards the necessary accounting
sophistication. The rules and principles of accounting with which the lawyer
is most likely to deal are often as flexible as their legal counterparts and, for
15. Pp. 272 et seq.





the lawyer, understanding the purpose and rationale behind accounting doctrine
is as important as understanding the policy behind rules of law. Professor
Shugerman's book does not itself provide this necessary background. Further-
more, it does not even adequately open for the reader the gateway to account-
ing treatises and periodicals.
In fairness to Professor Shugerman it should be recognized that he has
attempted a difficult job. It is not easy to be brief yet comprehensive and simple
yet analytic. Furthermore, it is by no means certain that the often difficult
field of accounting can be effortlessly opened to lawyers who, after all, are not
a breed apart. Perhaps subsequent editions of this work can remedy its defects
while continuing to provide the desired simplicity.
DoNALD ScHAPIRo'"
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN. By Wolfgang Fried-
mann. London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1951. Pp. xxiv, 322. $6.75.
TMR. Friedmann, the well-laiown author of Legal Theory, has worked his
recent articles into a panorama of the rapidly changing legal scene. Against
the background of the British and to some extent of the Commonwealth law,
he presents a lucid description of the present status and function of property
and contract, the relations between social insurance and tort, and a sketch
of judicial withdrawal and neutrality in freedom of trade cases. To these
chapters has been added a completely new section, scrutinizing the changed
functions of Anglo-American trusts. On the basis of this analysis the author
enters a plea for a more vigorous assertion of judicial authority in cases con-
cerning professional bodies and private associations. The second and a good
part of the third book provide some systematization of British public law,
concentrating on extension of legal remedies, the relationship between contract
and administrative law, the limits of administrative discretion, and conflicting
methods of statutory interpretation.
In his last and somewhat controversial chapter, the author inquires into
the place of the rule of law in a democratic planned society. The central thesis
of the book is built around the demonstration that the rule of law is perfectly
compatible with the major tenets and operations of such a society. This rule
of law (construed without reference to Dicey's vindictiveness against adminis-
trative law and its exclusive enforcement through the law courts) possesses
a dual function: judicial authority continues to safeguard individual rights:
yet there is equal emphasis on its ability to assure equality of the law for those
engaging in comparable legal transactions. To be sure, the effective extension
of safeguards of individual rights through the abolition of civil and criminal
immunities of the Crown and the current narrowing down of the Acts of
-Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
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